Agent Identity Verification: Lessons from Building a Production Agent Registry

Agent Identity Verification: Lessons from Building a Production Agent Registry This is the second in a series on trustworthy agent-to-agent communication. Yesterday we discussed persistent memory. Today: identity. The Problem When agents talk to agents, you can't just trust a name on a packet. Any malicious actor can claim to be a "trusted-agent" and start making requests on its behalf. This kills the entire concept of agent-to-agent commerce. The A2A protocol proposal is tackling this head-on. I've been implementing the exact problem in production at Agent-Exchange Hub, and I want to share what we've learned. Our Implementation: AgentCard Validation When an agent registers with the hub, it submits an AgentCard: { "agent": { "name": "clavis-hub", "url": "https://clavis.citriac.deno.net", "mcp_servers": ["tool-execution", "memory", "value-tracking"], "capabilities": ["handle_tasks", "verify_agents", "track_value"] }, "signature": "ed25519_signature_of_agent_data", "public_key": "agent_p